

● PSF: Office of Strategic Services: Donovan Reports, April 13-28, 1942
Folder #9

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PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1942

Donovan Report

No. 9

April 13 to 28

No. 400

GENERAL PLAN

April 13, 1942

6:00 P.M.

I outlined to Mr. Casey our belief that our operative and intelligence organizations should, like

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I have heard from Richard Casey. My talk with him was based on an arrangement made by us with the British on April 4 and with the Yugoslavs. I attach a memorandum of the general plan. All of this I have thoroughly discussed with the Office of the Chiefs of Staff. This is done for the purpose of attempting to effect some kind of a diversion in the event that the Germans move in through Yugoslavia.

Mr. Casey spoke to me about additional funds in the form of gold, but I told him that I would prefer to do nothing about that until specific situations arise which might justify your authorization. I am a little inclined myself to the belief that while bribery should not be ignored, patriotism is more effective. I will not call upon you for gold unless it is essential.

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GENERAL PLAN

I outlined to Mr. Casey our belief that our subversive and intelligence organizations should, like theirs, be separate; and that while as to subversive activities we would work in combination with their organization in the Middle East, in order to insure the maximum results from both, we would on the other hand develop and maintain our own intelligence organization, with liaison through the directing officer in Cairo. In this way, we will obtain double security, and the collapse of any part of one intelligence system will not affect the other.

As to the intelligence side, I pointed out to him the necessity of our own wireless facilities in the Middle East, and he agreed to pursue the matter on our behalf in London.

Once preliminary arrangements are made we can, if necessary, present the matter formally through regular diplomatic channels.

As to subversive activities, including such activities as supplying General Mihailovitch's forces, I suggested that we work in partnership, with the command

being in British hands since the Middle East is predominantly a British theatre of war. I proposed that command of combined subversive activities in a given area should follow the command of the combined military operations in the area, unless there was some good reason otherwise. The question of supplies for such activities should also be handled in the same way that questions of ordinary military supplies for the area concerned are handled - in this case requests for supplies going in the first instance to London, to be forwarded to Washington if the material requested cannot be supplied from London.

I also told Mr. Casey that I was opposed to working out and signing a long and detailed agreement, specifying precise sums of gold to be contributed by us, etc. I suggested that we proceed on the general principles set out above, the details to be worked out as they arise on the basis of a common endeavor of men of good will, with either of us being free to withdraw if it becomes apparent that for any reason, separate activities might be more effective.

Mr. Casey is taking these matters up in London at

of continued
continued & British
point to British

- 3 -

the first opportunity, and is to let me know the results. I have several trained men ready to send to Cairo at once to carry through the arrangement.

No. 401

April 13, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

We are making a study of the Scandinavian situation. The purpose of this study is to examine the situation in Norway, Sweden and Finland with respect to possible Axis or Allied political and military action in 1942. The study will examine the political situation in these countries, their position in the German war economy, and the logistical problems involved in both Axis and Allied penetration.

I. The Political Position of Scandinavia

A. Norway

1. The Underground Movement
2. The Strength of the Pro-German Group
3. Probable Reactions to Allied Military Action

B. Sweden

1. General Factors Affecting Swedish Outlook on War
 - (a) fear of Russia
 - (b) economic ties to Germany
 - (c) sympathy for Norway and Pro-Allied sentiment
2. Political Groups
 - (a) the major parties
 - (b) the labor unions

- (c) the army
- (d) key personalities

3. Recent Trends

- (a) consequences of German Russian War
- (b) consequences of persecutions in Norway
- (c) consequences of American entry into war

C. Finland

1. Finland's Position in Russian War

- (a) desire for quick victory
- (b) desire for long run security
- (c) isolation from Allies; dependence on Germany

2. Political Groups

- (a) the major parties
- (b) the army (Mannerheim)
- (c) key personalities

3. Recent Trends

- (a) the food shortage
- (b) consequences of prolongation of war

D. Conclusions

Speculation on (a) possibilities of affecting Allied position in Scandinavia through propaganda or diplomacy;
(b) probable reaction of the three areas to Allied military action of various kinds: major attempt to reconquer Scandinavia; expedition to Northern Norway; expeditionary force to Murmansk.

II. The Economic Role of Scandinavia in the German War Economy

This section is virtually finished. It examines the contribution of Scandinavia to the German supply of strategic minerals, wood products, foodstuffs, merchant shipping, and industrial production, and weighs the consequences to the German war economy of denial of the whole area. It concludes that the loss of the area would have serious long and short run consequences on the German war effort.

III. The Logistics of Scandinavia

- A. The Terrain. Basic factors affecting defense or attack:
road and railway net, principal harbors, lessons of campaign of April 1940.
- B. German Military Preparations.
 - 1. Present German Order of Battle
 - 2. German Air Defense: location and adequacy of air fields.
 - 3. Possibility of Germany concentrating large forces in Scandinavia: transport facilities and routes; probable margin of German strength available in West.
- C. The Possible Role of the Swedish Armed Forces
 - 1. Size of Establishment: army, navy, air force
 - 2. Routes to Norway
 - 3. Conditions, political and military, under which Swedish Army would fight with or against Allies.
- D. Logistical Considerations Affecting Possible Allied Action

E. Conclusions

Military conclusions examined in light of political and economic conclusions: the type and scale of Allied action capable of producing the maximum military, economic, and political results. *

March 11, 1942

No. 402

April 13, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached is a brief report on our weekly shortwave radio operations. The report concerns volume rather than content.

March 31, 1942

WEEKLY NEW YORK STUDIO PRODUCTION

REBROADCAST:

French)	7 - 15 min. shows
German)	1 - 15 min. show (extra platter for shipment)
Italian)	8 for each language
English)	32 - 15 min. shows - <u>8 hours</u>

WLWO - Live

English	- -	49 - 15 min. shows
German	- -	42 - 15 " "
French	- -	42 - 15 " "
Italian	- -	42 - 15 " "

255 - 63 hours and 45 minutes

SPECIAL FEATURES

German American Observer	. . .	3 - 15 min. shows
German Health Report	. . .	4 - 8 " "
German Science Report	. . .	2 - 8 " "
Classical Arabic	. . .	6 - 15 " "
Egyptian Arabic	. . .	5 - 15 " "
Turkish	. . .	6 - 15 " "
Dutch	. . .	6 - 5 " "
Czech	. . .	3 - 15 " "
Finnish	. . .	1 - 15 " "

36 - 7 hours and 18 min.

March 31, 1942

DAILY NEW YORK NEWS AND FEATURE PRODUCTION

NEWS -- including midnight newscast, sunrise newscast, Frisco newscast, Far East newscast, Czech newscast, Finn newscast, Leopoldville	17,240 words
SCRIPTS -- Regulars - United America Fights, Fight for Freedom Victory for Philippines	4,800 "
-- Specials - from 300 to 1,500 words, translated in varying number of languages dependent upon purpose, etc.	3,200 "
TOTAL	25,240 "

United America Fights goes into Danish, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish, Turkish.

Fight for Freedom goes into varying number according to purpose.

Victory for Philippines goes into English only at this point.

A 1500-word Greek program is produced once each week.

A Turkish program is produced daily - about 3000 words.

A similar program is produced in Egyptian and Syrian Arabic.

Also, a running news report is edited and prepared for Edd Johnson's staff. This is also made available to the Regional Desks, etc.

Daily - 7 days a week - Propaganda analysis report - 6 a.m. and 12 noon. 850 words each report -- total 1700 words. At 3 p.m. there is a special Latin American report which goes to all stations on what the Axis is saying to Latin America. This is also sent to CIAA representatives here and a copy to the Propaganda Section at 444 Madison Avenue. (Medium wave report at 6 p.m.)

WASHINGTON - Cabled News Reports

Cabled News Reports are as follows: PHILIPPINE (twice-daily service to Luzon); CEBU: CHUNGKING (twice-daily about 2500 words); AUSTRALIAN (nightly-about 500-800 words); BRITISH (nightly 600-900 words); London also receives a drop copy of our daily editorial round-up prepared primarily for Stockholm and Cairo; STOCKHOLM-CAIRO-daily service, 800-900 words; ICELAND-GREENLAND, daily - about 1,100 words; SWISS, 4 times a week; LEOPOLDVILLE-daily, handled in New York.

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You will recall that in January you authorized us to buy time from the various companies in order that we might have control over what went out over the stations.

This has not yet gone through because it has not been approved by the Budget. At this very critical period it would be most helpful if we could have that done under our immediate direction and programming.

No. 403

April 13, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

In our Foreign Propaganda Planning Group we are having the following general outline up for discussion.

This is a world-wide war of liberation. We are fighting to liberate the peoples of the world -

From the terror of the Gestapo

From the ruthless cruelty of the tyrant - of the political tyrant, the economic tyrant, and the military tyrant.

This is a peoples' war.

We are fighting for freedom against totalitarian slavery.

We are fighting to make a commonwealth of free men.

We are fighting -

- (1) For freedom within the world-wide order of the Commonwealth.
- (2) For freedom to organize society and utilize the world's resources in the interest of the Commonwealth.

We are fighting for a society in which -

- (1) The Governors are removable by the peoples' will.
- (2) No one man has absolute authority, and the exercise of power is controlled by constitutional safeguards.
- (3) Government is responsible to the general welfare rather than to the interests of particular pressure groups.
- (4) There is opportunity to work, to produce, and to trade within the interest of the Commonwealth.
- (5) There is freedom to act on religious faith.
- (6) There is freedom to participate through discussion in the process of formulating national policy.

To this end, the Government of the United States is -

- (1) Accumulating vast stock piles of food and raw materials to be used as soon as victory is won - food for the starving peoples of occupied countries, and raw materials to set the wheels of industry freely moving again for civilian purposes.

- (2) Preparing to revitalize the world's economic system through world-wide collaboration with free peoples along the lines of its recent lend-lease agreement with Great Britain.
- (3) Preparing to use its forces in the post-war world to maintain the conditions necessary for the realization of these objectives.

In the light of the past twenty-five years, it is apparent that peace cannot be made by inaction. The field when plowed and left untended produces weeds. A world unorganized produces tyranny and war.

The destiny of America is not the destiny of a race or of a class or of a military imperialism. Our destiny is related to the destiny of men as persons - to the dignity and grandeur of personal life. Man was not made for the state but the state for man. Our aim is to create an order within the discipline of the Commonwealth. That is our mission. And upon that mission we have embarked.

No. 404

April 14, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

For your information, the following is a memorandum handed to me by one of the British SO men. We are working on this basis.

"In general terms it was agreed that joint Anglo-American SOE activities in any theatre of war are not the direct concern of the Chiefs of Staff. They do, however, become concerned over questions of supply."

"The correct procedure in a British theatre of war is for all applications for materials to be submitted in the ordinary way to London. If the Munitions Assignment Board there cannot supply what is required they will forward a bid to the United States Munitions Assignment Board through the British Chiefs of Staff in Washington."

"If this is done SOE New York should be advised and given the whole story so that the necessary explanations can be given to the Chiefs of Staff Washington to enable them to press the case."

"Arrangements should be made that the Chiefs of Staff are asked by the Munitions Assignment Board in London to consult British Security Coordination regarding the matter to ensure that there is no chance of a slip up. Until this stage

-2-

is reached SO'S people should take no hand and should certainly not put in a separate bid for the material. In an American theatre of war the procedure is reversed and the application for material is first made by the SO organization in the usual way. "

"As to the position in Latin America, this could be no concern of the British Chiefs of Staff since it is a purely Western Hemisphere matter. The United States Chiefs of Staff are fully aware of the importance of and the dangers in Latin America."

No. 405

April 14, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is for your information and is taken from a letter which I have just received from Commander John Ford who has been in Honolulu for the past six or eight weeks making the Pearl Harbor film requested by the Navy:

"These islands from a military view are merely bases for striking forces, Army and Navy. This, to my view, is their only advantage. The Army talks in terms of defense-- the Navy in terms of offense. They do not get together. As this is the front line of Naval striking force, we need the supreme command in Navy hands."

"The local Japanese situation is distorted. N. I. and M.I.D. are poles apart. Their efforts are not coordinated. F.B.I. acts independently. Example; M.I.D. turns over for our use as liaison man with local Japs a supposedly loyal American of Jap ancestry, fully vouched for by the Army. Three days later, F.B.I. picks him up and throws him in jail.-- complete lack of coordination of information."

" We are doing the Japanese espionage stuff very thoroughly. It's fascinating and quite exciting. Personally, I do not trust any of the Japanese. I honestly believe the majority of them are tainted. It's strange since the "Raid" how very Oriental Honolulu appears--thousands upon thousands of Jap faces. We have been photographing scores of Jap signs to show the character of the town. Now you can hardly see one. They have all taken down their signs and have substituted English lettering. Example; 'Banzai Cafe'--beers and liquors-- is now the 'Keep Em Flying Cafe'. The Army is being influenced in its Japanese attitude by Walter Dillingham. Naturally, the 'Big Five' would be embarrassed economically by any curtailment of Oriental skilled help. Most of the key positions-- chief bookkeepers, time-keepers, expert accountants, skilled mechanics, plantation foremen, are Japs."

"From the best sources, they estimate about six hundred active agents still loose on the island. I figure triple that number. Some amazing stories of spying leak out daily, some cunning, some crude, but information is getting out. Up to this date, April 3, the mountains have not been carefully searched for sending sets. Pistols are fired at midnight, fires start, etc. I wish they would open up and light up the town and coax them back again. I'm sure this time they'd never get back. And I am reluctantly forced to admit, despite my former reasoning drawn from some knowledge of the Jap, that

he will come back, if only for a token raid--perhaps an incendiary attack on Honolulu proper. There have been too many authenticated flights of single planes, presumably launched from subs, over the city at night--these reconnaissance flights are for some purpose. It has one good effect, it keeps the Army boys on their toes. "

"As for our work, we're really working hard but the result should and will be magnificent. Our story of the "Raid on Pearl Harbor" must be the best documentary of all times. It is, first, a great historic document. I am not sacrificing truth for fiction. This thing we're doing is the real thing--actually the stuff we've gotten so far is grand."

No. 406
April 13, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a report of British Home Intelligence for week ending April 6, 1942.

"Slight rise in public spirits which was mentioned in the last report appears to be maintained. So does the mood of expectancy which still is ill-defined. There is 'an air of suspense, of waiting for something to happen'. Lack of new disasters and indications of British vigor and initiative contribute. However, the public will need many more signs that Britain is passing from an attitude of defense to the much desired aggressive spirit before it can be described again as 'on its toes'.

The general trend of public thought is toward attack rather than defense. The St. Nazaire attack, the recent heavy raids on France and Germany and the successful passage of the Murmansk convoy have had the effect of a tonic but the public still reacts to them as spectators rather than as participants. According to one RIO: 'Private considerations and the lure of personal gains still weigh more with many persons than does the cause'. Lack of interest in the war and reluctance to talk about it are mentioned by 7 RIO's. 'The public appears to be

concentrating on what they can do for themselves'. They are preoccupied with domestic or home affairs such as civil defense or 'digging for victory'. The general tone of most reports suggested that there still exists a 'sense of frustration which, though no longer at boiling point, exists as a background for discontent'.

"On India, there is very great admiration for Cripps, this being 'more of a compliment to his personality than optimism concerning the result of his mission'. There are fears that India will go the way of Burma. In some quarters the government is criticized for 'putting the plan forward too late'. 'We should have won India by an offer of Dominion Status immediately following the Atlantic charter'.

"United States. About the USA there is little comment but satisfaction is reported that 'they are doing something at last'. Postal censorship confirms some belief in USA support 'as soon as they get into their stride'. Complaints come from the same source on the behavior of U.S. troops now in England. It is alleged that they 'all talk', and resentment is expressed at their tone: 'It is about time we came over to win the war for you'. It is felt that they are 'throwing their weight around'.

"Russia. Sympathy and admiration continue as before for Russia, but anxiety is reported again by 5 RIO's at the

apparent slowing down of the progress and prospects of the Red Army.

"News presentation and broadcasting. There exists 'annoyance' at expressions such as 'strategic withdrawal' and 'straightening of lives' in Burma. Listeners research report No. 78 discloses that in the last few weeks the level of listening to news bulletins has decreased by 20 per cent.

"Post-war conditions. This week 3 Ministry of Information speakers and 4 RIO's refer to interest of the public in post-war conditions. People 'demand to be informed what sort of post-war society our rulers contemplate as a result of victory'. Two of the RIO's refer to the belief that 'production would be improved if something could be done to convince workers that post-war conditions would be better than those which they now enjoy'. 'A definite statement by the government, - preferably the Prime Minister -, on conditions in this country after the war would do a great deal to improve the war effort'.

"Food. There is little complaining about it but growing demand for 'equality in distribution' and strong feeling that 'luxury foods should not be at the disposal of only the wealthy'. The abolition of white bread was taken with very little complaint.

"Black markets and anti-semitism. From Midland and London areas and from police duty room reports references to an increase in anti-semitism, said to be due principally to 'the frequent

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occurrences of Jewish names in news reports of black market cases'. Other reasons cited for the increase or prevalence of anti-semitism are 'the many current stories of Jewish evasion of duties and regulations, and the 'apparent unwillingness to take action, on the part of Jewish leaders'".

No. 407

April 14, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I know your interest in geography and following is a report prepared by us in response to an inquiry on behalf of the Office of Naval Intelligence. This inquiry read in part as follows:

"Specifically, what is desired is information on the average ice conditions prevailing during the winter in the Straits of Tartary, i.e., average thickness of the ice, its capacity to sustain a temporary railway line across it, etc."

In an attempt to appraise the practicability of using ice-transport between the Island of Sakhalin and the mainland of Siberia, as a link in a supply route from the United States to Russia, the following subjects would appear to require consideration:

1. Port facilities on the eastern shore of Sakhalin Island.
2. Land communications from such port or ports to points on the western shore of Sakhalin Island (on the Tartar Strait and the Gulf of Amur).
3. Communications from the western shore of these waters to inland points in Siberia.

These three subjects are treated only very briefly, or not at all, in the present memorandum. An attempt is being made to collect further information under these headings.

MON: 11/11/1918 2. DODGINS
RECORDED TO THE SECRETARY

- 2 -

THE TARTAR STRAIT AND THE GULF OF AMUR.

Extending from the La Perouse Strait in the South to the Sakhalin Gulf in the North, the Tartar Strait comprises: 1/2. Entering the Gulf of Amur, this channel branches into: 1. Gulf of Tartary, south of the line C. Sushchev-Viakhtu Bay; The South channel, which passes along the Siberian coast; 2. Tartar Strait proper, i.e., the narrows extending northward from this line to the line C. Lazarev - G. Pogobi; and 3. Gulf of Amur (Amurskii Liman), from Lat. 52°14' N. to Lat. 53½° N.

Parts of the Tartar Strait proper are frequently called by special names: Nevelskoi Strait (the southern section), and Mania Rinco (from C. Muravev to C. Lazarev).

Only the Tartar Strait proper and the Gulf of Amur are covered in the present memorandum. Almost entirely occupied by banks of sand and mud, formed by silt from the Amur River, these waters are closed to navigation, except through the following channels: 2/3.

1/ Karta Soiuz S.S.R., III, 1926; scale = 1:6,000,000. Also: Bolshoi Sovetskii Atlas Mira (The Large Soviet Atlas of the World), v. II, Moscow, 1939, plate 91-92. Data respecting the configuration of this waterway, the width at some of its points, the navigable channels, and the winter routes over the ice, are taken from Letsia Severo-Zapadnoi Chasti Vostochnogo Okeana (Sailing Directions for the North-Western Section of the Pacific), II, St. Petersburg, 1904; also Dopolnenie k II chasti (The Supplement to Part II), corrected to January 1, 1912, St. Petersburg, 1912.

2/ Ibid., p. 247.

1. In the Tartar Strait proper, there is only one narrow channel; six miles long (from c. Muravev to c. Lazarev), it has a depth of 17 feet at high water.

2. Entering the Gulf of Amur, this channel branches off into two fairways:

a) The South channel, which passes along the Siberian mainland and leads finally to the Amur estuary.

b) The Sakhalin channel, which leads through the eastern part of the Gulf, along the shore of the Sakhalin Island, and serves as a passage northward to the gulf by the same name.

Opposite Khagemif Islands these two channels meet for a short distance, affording thus a passage from one channel into the other.

The South Channel varies in its width from one-half of one cable's length to two miles, and has two bars: one with only 12 feet of water (between cc. Dshaore and Pronge), and the other with 17 feet of water, opposite c. Hale. The Sakhalin Channel is wider and deeper. Its only bar has about 21 feet of water. 1/

3. The third channel in the Gulf of Amur is called the North (or Nevelskoi) Channel. It leads from the Amur estuary into the Sakhalin Gulf, along the Siberian mainland. At the northern entrance to this channel (four miles northward of the eastern end of Langr Island) there

1/ Lotsila Severo-Zapadnoi Chasti Vostochnogo Okeana, II, pp. 254-257.

is a bar with a depth of 13 feet at low water. At high water the channel is available to vessels drawing not over 17 feet. 1/

ICE CONDITIONS IN THE TARTAR STRAIT AND THE GULF OF AMUR.

The Tartar Strait proper and the Gulf of Amur, as well as the southern part of the Sakhalin Gulf, are frozen over from about mid-November to about May, as far northward as Lat. 53°39' N. 2/

The congelation seldom is sudden and usually the surface of the ice is rough. The average thickness of the ice varies from 3-3½ feet over the channels to 5 feet over the banks. The ice breaks up first in the northern part of the Gulf of Amur. In the narrows (south of c. Lazarev) it stays until the whole of the southern approach to the strait (up to c. Nevelskoi) is free of ice. Usually this takes place toward the end of May. 3/

1/ Sailing Directions for Siberia and Chosen, H. O. No. 112, 3d ed., Washington, 1932, p. 259.

2/ Sailing Directions for Siberia and Chosen, p. 248. In another place, these Directions state that northward of the Line from due across to Castris Bay, "the Gulf and Strait of Tartary are closed by ice during the winter months.... the earliest ice observed during 15 years' observation was on November 5, and the latest was May 22" (p. 227). The Russian Sailing Directions, however, refers to these dates as those of earliest congelation and latest breaking up of the ice in the Gulf of Amur, respectively (Dopolnenie k II chasti, p. 58).

3/ Lotsia Severo-Zapadnoi Chasti Vostochnogo Okeana, pp. 260-261 and 463. Thickness of the ice, of up to 4 feet over the channels, and of 7 feet over the shallows, have been recorded in the northern section of the Gulf of Amur (Ibid., p. 463). The Amur River itself is frozen over from early November to the beginning of May, the thickness of ice averaging 5 ft. (Ibid., pp. 270 and 410, respectively).

Winter travel and the traffic of goods across the ice is by dog and horse drawn sleighs, the latter commencing in about 3-5 days later than the former. The usual routes across the ice used throughout the winter are the following:

1. From c. Lazarev to c. Pogobi and to Aleksandrovskii. The latter route passes across the Nevelskoi Strait (southern part of the Tartar Strait proper) and is also the mail route from Nikolaevsk (on the Amur) to Sakhalin. 1/
2. From the Bolshoi Island of the Khagemif group directly eastward across the Gulf of Amur. 2/
3. From Cape Puir to Nanivo, and
4. From Langr Island to Petumbopo. 3/

Although "to the north of the de Castries - due line, the Tartar Strait is frozen over for an average of four months," and "the southern part of the Sakhalin Gulf is frozen over for about the same period of time," 4/ no mention has been found of winter travel to and from Sakhalin across the ice in these areas.

1/ Lotsia Severo-Zapadnoi Chasti Vostochnogo Okeana, pp. 21 and 158.

2/ Ibid., pp. 260-261. This route is always used by the natives from the region of the Chome, Uarke and My rivers on the Siberian mainland.

3/ Ibid., p. 463.

4/ Dopolnenie k II chasti, p. 21, and Sailing Directions for Siberia and Chosen, p. 248, respectively. The yearly Soviet hydro-meteorological reports from 1926 to 1932 show that during some winters the Tartary Strait at the Kloster-Kamp Lighthouse did not freeze.

BAIKAL BAY AND MOSKALVO.

The Baikal Bay is about 11 miles wide and about 13 miles deep. Across the entrance to the bay stretches the Ush Island, which is $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles long and has an average width of about 1 mile.

Two entrances lead into the bay. The shortest and most direct of the two is the western entrance. It has, however, a bar with only 12-14 feet of water. ^{1/} The eastern entrance has a minimum depth of 22 feet. Its channel is narrow and winding. At the widest and deepest section (3.5 to 4 cables' length wide and 70 feet deep) it runs close to the Sakhalin mainland and near the village Moskalvo, which is situated across from the eastern part of Ush Island.

While no data are available on the actual thickness of the ice in the bay, the following has been observed: the grease ice appears towards the end of October; by mid-November the bay is frozen, the traffic over the ice by dogs and horses commencing a few days after the congelation. The ice stays late: in 1931, the horse-drawn traffic ended on June 6th. In 1932 the ice in the bay was broken on June 9th. This is due to the general shallowness of the bay. ^{2/}

^{1/} Sailing Directions for Siberia and Chosen, p. 205, gives 12 feet. The latest Soviet data show a minimum depth of 14 feet (Lotsia Okhotskogo Moria, Sailing Directions for the Sea of Okhotsk, Leningrad, 1938, p. 52.).

^{2/} Svedeniia o sostoianii l'dov na moriakh SSSR (The State of Ice in the Seas of the U.S.S.R.), VII, winter 1930-31, Leningrad, 1934, p. 48, and ibid., VIII, winter, 1931-32, Leningrad, 1936, p. 51. Also: D. V. Sokolov, N. N. Tikhonovich, Sakhalin, Moscow, 1925, p. 16.

Moskalvo is the oil exporting port for the Okha oilfields, with which it is connected by a 23-mile normal gauge railroad and an oil pipe (a harbor boom 985 feet long extending out into the Baikal Bay, toward Ush Island, affords rapid transfer of oil to the ships). Two miles southward of the town there is a 285-foot wharf built about 500 yards from the beach and connected to it by a runway. 1/ This position of the wharf corresponds to the location referred to as "a good anchorage at six cable's length south of cape Vnutrennii and one mile and two cable's length from Moskalvo." 2/ The port facilities include pilot services and radio beacon. Cargo is landed entirely by ships' gear.

1/ Stephansson, Report on Sakhalin, pp. 10 and 14.

2/ Lotsiia Okhotskogo Moria, p. 53.

No. 408

April 14, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought you would be interested to know about one of the tangible results achieved in our radio work recently.

The FCC daily monitoring analysis dated April 6 reports that on April 4 Radio-Berlin quoted Jean Luchaire, writing in LES NOUVEAUX TEMPS, as follows:

"If Mr. Laval's conversations thus far have had no result, this is only because of United States pressure which has been administered on the one hand by noisy radio propaganda and on the other by clandestine but effective diplomatic maneuvers."

For the past two weeks we have conducted a most intensive radio campaign aimed at France with two objects in mind:

1. To reveal to the French people the true facts of the political intrigues by which the Germans hoped to get Laval into the cabinet.
2. To make suggestions to the French people in order to create a fear in the minds of the enemy that large scale disorders would break out in France if they persisted in pushing Laval.

Our campaign started within 1/2 hour after the first press despatch from Vichy announcing that Laval had conferred with Darlan. The next day the State Department asked us to conduct a strong campaign and we accordingly intensified and multiplied the efforts we had already started.

No. 409

April 14, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

From the most recent British Ministry of Economic Warfare propaganda survey, the following appears to give evidence of Axis production difficulties:

1. (a) Funk's acknowledgement of using costs in statements to shareholders Reichsbank meeting that while production rose in 1941, incomes increased even more.
- (b) 50% decrease in Italian war production due:
 1. Reduction in expenditure from 7,000,000,000 LIRE per month to 5,000,000,000.
 2. Inefficient wage and price stops.
 3. Most efficient labor moved to Germany.
2. More drastic black market regulations in France permitting 10 years imprisonment, 10,000,000 francs.
3. Greece's financial load is eased, occupation costs removed due to the fact that Greece is milked dry.
4. Labor drive extended to Belgium, Holland principally aimed at unemployed. In Belgium, wages deliberately are kept low in comparison with wages paid to Belgian workers in Germany. VERWILGHEN, Secretary General, Ministry of Labor, resigned as a protest against German labor measures.

-2-

5. For the first time on the continent, fruit and vegetables are to be rationed by Belgium.

No. 410

April 15, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Here are two additional cables from our man in Tangier which were received yesterday. All of the Eddy cables were the subject of discussion at the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting yesterday and are under consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

"No. 28 - Re my number 24. We are also asked by our French partners how soon we would be able to furnish heavy material to Bathurst, Freetown or Liberia and kept there by Americans secret from knowledge of agents of the Axis and ready for French vessels to pick it up and transport to Morocco or Tunis at H. hour. List in following dispatch in which page references are to 'Science te La Nie', December 1941.

"No. 29 - One thousand motorcycles with postillion seat. Five hundred motorcycles with side cars and 2-wheel drive, fifty 105MM howitzers with trucks and tractors, one hundred fifty 105MM anti-aircraft page 335, three hundred

- 2 -

37 MM anti-aircraft page 335, ammunition for all of these guns, four hundred fifty M-2A4 tanks page 338, three hundred M-3QRT-6 tanks and one hundred fifty scout cars page 337. One hundred fifty AUTOMITRAILLEUSES (probably jeeps)."

No. 411

April 15, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

Further on the subject of the recent cables from our man in Tangier, I send you herewith a cable which has just been received and which indicates that more follows. The remainder of the report will be forwarded to you as soon as the decoding has been completed. This entire matter was discussed with Secretary Knox by Colonel Buxton of my office this morning.

"With reference to your number 21. Other departments naturally have no evidence corroborating Secret Intelligence of well organized French military organization determined to resist the Axis. Only Murphy can confirm and he is urgently requesting me to finance and supply on the modest scale requested in my recent dispatches. French leaders would be arrested on slightest suspicion and shot if exposed. They have no news in advance of Laval government

- 2 -

and fear Vichy surrender of North Africa soon.
If Malta falls, Germans plan to enter Tunisia
with or without Spanish zone attack on Morocco.
More follows."

No. 412

April 15, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in a bit of information which came to us last night. We were informed that on yesterday between 11:00 and 12:00 A.M., ten or twelve large packages containing all of the secret papers and files of the French Consulate in New York City were removed from the Consulate and taken to the home of the French Minister in New York, one Jacques d'Aumle. This information has been passed on to those interested.

No. 413
April 14, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is from a direct source in North China:

Chief puppet officials Wang Yi Tang, leader; Chi Hsieh Yuan (Chih Sieh Yuan) commander; Chou Tso Jen, education; ostensibly under Nanking but actually autonomous. The numerous Japanese employees in puppet government offices wield real authority. The puppet government maintains several ten thousands poorly equipped troops. The Japs realize their untrustworthiness if they are used against the central government. The highways and railways are lined with trenches and pillboxed masonry. One division of Japanese troops stationed near Shangshui Honan. All Chinese must have living certificates, and if they are caught without one, they are subject to arrest. A specimen has been furnished to Dr. Rowe to photograph. The cost of living is tenfold cheaper than in Chungking. Quantities of Japanese goods are displayed in markets. Transport of native produce is prohibited between different areas as ports South China. Japanese can thus buy cheaply the excess stocks. Participation in prosperous native businesses being demanded by Japanese. Opium trade is encouraged. Some municipal improvements have been made in Peiping. The populace appears mentally unhappy, but comfortably well off. Free speech is dangerous.

The vernacular Press is occupied with TIIUI and political or international news. In Manchuria all foodstuffs are commandeered by Japanese except at a port whose name has been garbled in transmission. The Karlan Mines have been taken over, but all employees, even the British technicians have been asked to remain to keep up the output.

Featuring the Burma situation is the lack of air support for the Allied Forces. Anxiety here leading to highest Chinese leader proceeding southward.

Secret unconfirmed reports. This understanding reached whereby British strength retires to India leaving Chinese forces to conduct Burma operations. Inadequate measures to cope with dreadful cholera epidemic on refugee route to India, via Chittagong, uphold allegations of slack Burma civil administration.

The objective is now to hold the Japanese on the Southern terrain until monsoon rains give defending forces the advantage of the dry northern areas. The burning of Mandalay was described to me by an eyewitness, who cited the observed accuracy of Japanese artillery fire.

S-17

April 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of a message sent from Vichy to the French Ambassador yesterday.

"No. 941. Après examen de la note du Gouvernement fédéral, en date du 13 avril, qui vous a été remise par M. Sumner Welles, je vous prie de notifier au Département d'Etat que le Gouvernement français ne saurait accepter les termes de cette note qu'il rejette en bloc.

"Ce document, en effet, est rédigé en termes insultants et son objet est d'essayer de discrediter aux yeux du monde, des citoyens français qui n'ont pas de leçons de patriotisme à recevoir de la part d'étrangers.

"Le gouvernement français, en outre, est obligé de noter que la publication insolite et immédiate de cet étrange document, montre qu'il a été conçu pour des fins de propagande et dans le but de troubler l'opinion publique française."

From a source which we believe to be reliable, the Irish Minister, Robert Brennan, yesterday informed the French Ambassador that he (Brennan) had been told by the Turkish Ambassador that negotiations were actually in progress for the conclusion of a separate peace between Russia and Germany.

From the same source we are informed that late yesterday Henri-Haye told his immediate collaborators that he thought the United States, after having left France to fight without aid, had forsaken her after her defeat, for only three Red Cross ships had been sent within twenty-two months. The only way to resist the Germans was to help France by letting her purchase American wheat and canned milk. There remains one last mistake the United States can commit, and that is to break diplomatic relations with France. This would deprive America of its observation posts on the Continent, of its valuable sources of information and of its listening posts in North Africa, all of which would delight Germany, because all of her efforts are precisely directed towards a rupture between France and the United States, and in the more or less near future this would involve the risk of tossing the French fleet into the enemy camp.

S-18

April 15, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

It has just come to us authoritatively that the officials at the French Embassy here are taking the attitude that "the end has come". It was stated that the Embassy here had received no communication from Vichy to the effect that Laval would be appointed, that although the Ambassador had speculated that he would be "the fait accompli" was a tremendous shock".

The statement was made that there was a feeling the situation might "cool down" because of a United Press report from Kuibyshev that the Russians have not been told of what had taken place in France. The statement was also made that the Americans "have lost their heads completely, and either they will lose them more by going further and recalling Admiral Leahy or they will let the whole thing drop -- they might commit the stupidity of trying to take Martinique, but in that case we

(The French) would have sufficient for our defense, with the German submarines in the Atlantic, not to mention the Bearn." The Ambassador feels Leahy will probably be recalled and that Henri-Haye will return to Vichy and be sent from there to Buenos Aires.

We have been told that one of the officials at the Embassy made the statement that "we collaborationists are delighted that Laval is in power now as we will have more benefits from Germany than we would have if we waited to play the German game after they had won -- it is obvious which side is winning otherwise France would never have taken this step which is completely in accord with her realistic policy."

From another source we are informed that yesterday Darlan sent the Embassy a message annulling a previous one to the effect that no visit of protest should be made; that the nature of the protest to Mr. Welles will be along the lines of a "mind your own business policy and saying that the United States has no right to choose France's cabinet for her as the United States has not yet vanquished France."

S-19

April 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

On yesterday the following message was sent from Vichy to the Ambassador here:

"En ce qui concerne le controle postal reclame par le gouvernement americain, nous acceptons, pour les courriers transportes par les navires de la ligne Antilles-Guyane qu'un controle postal soit effectuee Caraquito, port du Venezuela.

"Par contre, il doit etre entendu que les services postaux jouiront du libre passage sur le trajet Fort de France-Casablanca, etant bien entendu que les courriers francais ne comprendront que des correspondances provenant de la zone libre. Ces courriers pourront parvenir jusqu'a New York.

"Sous controle americain, un sac officiel contenant les communications du Gouvernement francais aux missions diplomatiques de l'hemisphere occidental pourra etre achemine par le mem voie Casablanca-New York.

"Veuillez en conferer avec le Department d'Etat des votre prochaine visite."

The following message was received at Vichy from the Ambassador:

"Il se confirme que la note de M. Sumner Welles, concue dans les termes etonnants que le gouvernement francais a cru devoir relever, a ete ecrite, connaissance prise, de la nouvelle orientation du cabinet francais et de sa transformation.

"Je dois etre recu demain soir a 6 heures par M. Sumner Welles, lequel aura vu le President Roosevelt, avant ma visite.

"La presse et la radio se livrent aux plus violentes attaques contre la France et plus particuliere-ment contre la personne meme de M. Pierre Laval.

"Toutefois, certains commentateurs insistent ce soir (en presence des declarations de M. Laval assurant que sa politique tiendra le juste milieu entre l'amite americaine et les bonnes relations avec l'Allemagne) sur la nece~~s~~site d'attendre l'annonce de la composition du cabinet francais ainsi que les declarations concernant sa politique, avant de prendre des positions definitives.

"Entre temps, M. Sumner Welles a annonce a sa

conference de presse, la suspension du trafic maritime avec l'Afrique du Nord et l'arret du depart du Mont-Everest qui devait appareiller avec une cargaison de la Croix-Rouge."

We have also received information today that Henri-Haye now expects to be appointed Minister of French North African possessions rather than Ambassador to the Argentine, if he is recalled from Washington.

No. 414

April 16, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is from the General Weekly Directive of the British Political Warfare Executive:

1. Strategy:

(a) Russia - Point out that the Russians still hold the initiative, maintaining pressure and continuing to deny the Germans the respite needed to refit and rest. Extensive areas are being rendered impassable by the thaws and large scale operations are impracticable.

(b) Malta - Emphasize that the Axis effort against Libya and Malta represents a considerable diversion, particularly of the Luftwaffe from the Russian front.

(c) Burma - The outlook is ominous because air support is lacking and the native population hostile.

(d) India and Ceylon - Avoid the linking of strategical positions of the European and Eastern theatres of war. Enemy has air and naval superiority due to presence of powerful Japanese naval squadrons including

several aircraft carriers in the Bay of Bengal. This is a threat to the Ganges, Delta, Ceylon, the Malabar Coast and our sea communications. A large British convoy has reached Bombay with war material and reinforcements.

2. Propaganda Policy

(a) We should not make a defensive response to distortions by Germans of closer links between America and Britain; and between India, Australia and America. "The helpful interest presently being taken by America in the security of Australia and India, in close accord with the British Government, is but another sign of what the Prime Minister once described as a certain mixing up of Anglo-American relations as a result of our common purpose in this war. This form of mixing-up can be represented as covering both moral and material aspects of war. The process of Lease-Lend has presently taken the form of America lending a Commander-in-Chief to Australia and of the lending of her good services in the settlement of the Indian problem. America's interest in world affairs, misrepresented by German propaganda, on the contrary is welcomed warmly in this country."

(b) The major theme for our propaganda should be

any one has communications.
several articles collected in the
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the conflict between Hitler's new order and the Christian church. The great significance of the resignation of the Norwegian bishops should be pointed out.

April 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of the report of Henry-Hay received in Vichy last night, following the Ambassador's visit to Sumner Welles.

"J'ai été reçu ce soir à 6 heures par le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat. Je lui ai fait part du rejet par le gouvernement français de la note qu'il m'avait remise et je lui ai demandé comment il jugerait la situation si c'était le gouvernement français qui se soit permis de lui remettre une note rédigée dans les termes dont il s'était servi.

"M. Welles n'a pas fait de difficultés pour reconnaître qu'en effet les termes de sa note étaient destinés au peuple français et avaient été rédigés quand avait été connue la venue de M. Laval au pouvoir.

"J'ai fait remarquer à mon interlocuteur que c'était une profonde erreur que de vouloir s'adresser au peuple français par-dessus son gouvernement, erreur que le président Roosevelt avait déjà commise au mois de mai dernier.

"M. Welles m'a alors dit que le gouvernement fédéral n'acceptait pas le rejet de la note, parce qu'il était convaincu

que les allemands avaient eu leur mot à dire sur la protestation française.

"Elevant le débat, le Sous-Secrétaire d'Etat m'a dit qu'au surplus les Etats-Unis se refusaient à conserver avec un gouvernement présidé par M. Laval, les relations qu'ils avaient eu jusqu'ici avec le gouvernement du Maréchal Pétain.

"J'ai mis en garde M. Welles contre les conséquences de décisions précipitées prises avant même de savoir quelles seraient les déclarations politiques du nouveau gouvernement français; rappelant mes souvenirs parlementaires, j'ai essayé de montrer que M. Laval s'était toujours efforcé, même et surtout quand il préconisait l'amitié franco-italienne, de neutraliser les volontés d'agression de l'Allemagne ce qui était bien évidemment un signe de patriotisme et de clairvoyance.

"J'ai d'autre part rappelé à mon interlocuteur les innombrables avantages et notamment les avantages d'ordre militaire, que les Etats-Unis avaient retiré de leurs bonnes relations avec la France, depuis l'armistice; j'ai souligné que le Maréchal Pétain restait chef de l'Etat et que le Président du Conseil serait responsable devant lui. M. Welles m'a dit qu'il ne croyait plus que le Maréchal Pétain soit en position de résister si M. Laval, chef du gouvernement, voulait prendre des décisions allant au-delà des assurances données par la France aux Etats-Unis.

"J'ai eu a ce moment l'impression très nette que le siège de M. Welles était fait, qu'aucun argument ne pouvait le faire changer d'idées, car il obéissait évidemment aux instructions qu'il avait reçues une heure avant au cours d'une entrevue avec le Président Roosevelt. L'entourage de celui-ci paraît avoir convaincu le Président de la nécessité d'une rupture immédiate avec la France, et peut-être d'actions militaires et navales préventives. De renseignements émanant des milieux navals, il résulte, en effet, que l'hypothèse d'une action brusquée contre la Martinique ne doit pas être entièrement écartée.

"M. Welles m'a parlé de "la fin du chapitre des relations actuelles", ce qui paraît bien indiquer la volonté des Etats-Unis de mettre fin à nos relations.

"J'ai conjuré le Secrétaire d'Etat de bien réfléchir avant de baisser le rideau de fer entre son pays et la France. Je me suis efforcé de lui montrer à quelles conséquences se heurterait un geste de la nature de celui qu'il me laissait prévoir. M. Welles est resté insensible à mes arguments, et tout en rendant hommage à mes efforts tous dirigés vers la préservation des bonnes relations franco-américaines.

"Il m'a laissé entendre que les positions étaient définitivement prises par son gouvernement.

"En somme, les Etats-Unis se refusent d'entrer en relations avec un cabinet français présidé par M. Laval ou

même comptant celui-ci parmi ses membres.

"Comme j'ai appris, par ailleurs, que M. Welles avait recommandé aux correspondants américains accrédités auprès de lui d'accentuer demain matin les attaques contre le gouvernement français, pourtant déjà si violentes, je ne puis que conclure avec une grande tristesse, que les relations franco-américaines sont arrivées au point de rupture désiré par les dirigeants américains."

No. 415

April 17, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

From: William J. Donovan

The following report has come to us from our man in Lisbon who has just returned to Lisbon from Madrid:

"In Spain the situation is tense, due to the rising dissention between the army and Falange and the growing dissatisfaction with the Franco regime. Recently in Madrid officers have torn down from the walls posters, showing workman, Falangist and army officer together. Immediate outbreak is believed unlikely. Franco will, however, soon have to choose between the generals or the party. As there are only two ordinary divisions between Hendaye and Bordeaux, invasion of the Iberian peninsula is not believed imminent, and if the Germans occupy the rest of France and invade Algeria, pushing overland to French Morocco, it may be foregone. Utilization of French Navy contemplated, and destruction of naval base at Gibraltar should be considered as later phase by operating against the rock in reverse. Ammunition practically exhausted at Malta. Heavy German air concentration on Dodacanese pointed to by Spanish General Staff as indication of an imminent invasion

-2-

of Turkey. There is a growing belief that all out drive against Russia may not develop. Regrouping and concentration of divisions inside Germany, particularly air-borne troops, gives weight to suggestion that we may expect all-out invasion of England.

No. 416

April 17, 1942

12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I thought you would want to see the directive we are following for Italy at the moment:

"1. Word has come from Italy of a doubt which is prevalent among the Italian people throughout the country. If the United Nations defeat the Axis, will the territorial integrity of Italy be respected? The people of all classes and all provinces, regardless of pro-fascist or anti-fascist leanings, are united on this one point. Memories of what happened to the defeated nations after the last war have been revived by fascist propaganda to scare the people. Will Italy be carved up and distributed among the victors? Our propaganda must be specific upon this point, not only citing the Atlantic Charter and other expressions of Allied war aims but also showing that infringement of Italian territorial integrity would not be to the interest of any of the United Nations. Also, all of recent history proves that British and American intentions are just the opposite.

"2. We should stress the difference between this war and the nationalistic wars of the past. The lines are no longer drawn between nations but between two conflicting

ideas of life. The line is drawn between the aggressive dictators - Hitler, Mussolini and Hirohito - who are forcing their people to fight a war of conquest, in order to throw the world back into slavery, and the freedom-loving people who are not only defending themselves and their right to live in peace, but also the rights of Man throughout the world. The line cuts across frontiers. Thus, within Italy, there is an enormous group whose aims are identical with those of the peoples of the United States. The war, then, is a continuation of the age-old struggle of free men against tyranny- not a war fought by England, the United States, etc., against Italy, Germany, and Japan. All this seems very obvious to us but in Italy there is still enough identification of the regime with the fatherland to make the point worth considerable educational effort. On the other hand we must not convey the idea that the fatherland is forever lost because it is now divided. Nor is the time ripe to stress post-war internationalism. Rather we should show that national unity and hence the real fatherland can only be restored by basing it upon the will of a free Italian people. As soon as this true will can be asserted, the nation will exist again. To point this truth, many examples may be given of national strength based on democracy. Italy's own pre-fascist strength should be stressed and it should be

insistently brought home that national collapse is being caused by Hitler and Mussolini.

"3. An explanation of the disappearance of empire from the world as obsolete under modern economic and technological conditions is desirable if carefully handled. The desire of the English people to give autonomy to India is important evidence of this. If we show that the conquest and attempt to colonize Ethiopia by Mussolini failed, for this same reason, to benefit Italy, the people will be comforted for its loss. The fact that Italians were unable to live off the conquered territory is a proof of the difficulty of trying to apply imperialism in the mid-twentieth century. Italians who went to Ethiopia had to spend Italian money there which would have done more good if spent in Italy. The cost of the conquest could never have been recovered. England, which was forced to capture Ethiopia from the fascist government in order to defend herself against German threats, has no intention of holding it as a colony. Intelligent people in England know today that free trade among independent nations is far more conducive to world prosperity than the acquisition of new colonies. For the same reasons, intelligent Italians know that they derived greater benefits from pre-war trade across the Adriatic than they can ever get from the present occupation of Albania and Jugoslavia. Only Hitler and Mussolini and the Japanese imperialists, who continue

to think in terms of the dead past, still believe that they can increase prosperity at home by conquering free peoples.

"4. We must not relax the exploitation of the current dominant emotion among the Italian people - hatred of Germany. There are, however, other approaches to this than by the mere recital of Germany's ruthless acts. The instinctive antipathy to Germans is centuries old and is the only real blood hate which is felt rather than reasoned. Thus reference may be made to basic opposition of thought and manners - German rudeness, lack of humor, single-track mind, insensitivity - and implemented by stories of the German tourists who flooded pre-war Italy every spring. Italians know today why they were there with their notebooks, diaries and Leica cameras - that they were preparing for German invasion and conquest of Italy. So the deep revulsion of Italians for these people, which even their natural hospitality and civility could not overcome, is now seen to be logically justified.

"5. The line to take about Laval is that he is the French Quisling. Germany has finally forced Petain to step aside for a real Quisling government. This will be just as successful in gaining French cooperation for the Axis as the same tactics have proved themselves in Norway and Holland."

No. 417

April 17, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The attached is a proposed radio and pamphlet attack on Italy which I now have up with the Planning Committee.

DECLASSIFIED

By Authority of

CIA

007622

By

ORS

Date SEP 10 1974

~~SECRET~~

ITALIAN PLAN

I

Policy Aims

1. To cause Italy to withdraw from the war.
2. To destroy Fascism in Italy.
3. To lay foundations for Italian cooperation in the post-war world.

II

Appreciation

1. An appendix to this plan, which may be used either in connection with the plan or separately by operating departments, will treat in detail of the characteristics of the Italian people.

The main inherent characteristics which should guide the use of this plan are frankness, a logical rather than a sentimental mind, hatred of hypocrisy, desire for specific facts and directness of approach.

1. Weakness of Italian morale.

The Italian will to Axis victory and Italian fidelity to the Fascist regime are close to zero. Distrust and hatred of the Germans is very high. There is extreme disapproval of war

and resentment of war-time hardships. Cleavages in Italian political-social structure are numerous and profound.

2. Strength of the regime.

(a) There is, however, an almost total absence of revolutionary leadership or organization. The efficiency of police forces at the command of the State is still very high and the loyalty of the police in carrying out orders can be counted on. On top of this, the German civilian and military control is very close.

(b) The following psychological factors militate against revolutionary movements: A sense of the impossibility of resistance to German occupation; a feeling among the oppositional elements of impotence and despair; the absence of constructive ideologies and ideologies which have any practical appeal to the Italian people, and the realistic appraisal of the military situation which is still favorable from the Axis viewpoint. This last factor weakens the will to accept the risks of military defeat which revolution might entail.

3. Nature of radio audience.

(a) The reception of medium waves is bad, due to jamming. Because of the small number of radio sets equipped with short wave reception and so capable of receiving foreign programs from long distances, the listening public on which we may count is restricted. Socially it is concentrated in the upper middle classes and aristocracy. Geographically it is centered in the big cities and in the North. Such an audience is not adapted to mass appeals - powerful emotional effects or inspirational programs.

(b) The official propaganda policy of the Fascist Government has been, however, short-sighted and reckless and the censorship has been very severe. The psychological conditions, therefore, are extremely favorable to the propagation of rumors, and Italians of all classes are inveterate rumor-mongers. There is an extraordinarily effective grapevine in Italy which often reaches out even from Fascist officials, who, like other Italians, cannot resist talking when they are off duty.

Consequently, while our short wave programs should be directed toward the more intelligent listeners, they should provide these listeners with concrete facts which have been suppressed by the Italian censorship

and presented in anecdotal form suitable for propagation by word of mouth.

(c) The lower strata of the people may be reached by leaflets, preferably containing brief emotional or humorous appeals and picture material, especially cartoons.

III

Political Objectives

1. To nourish and, if possible, extend existing cleavages:
 - (a) Between Germans and Italians, particularly between German and Italian Army officials.

Themes:

1. The systematic economic exploitation of Italy by the Germans should be implemented by specific examples, such as German confiscation of food, the German use of the Italian railways and ships to transport their materials, depriving Italians of their use for essential food-stuffs, etc.; the weakening of the forces of production for home consumption by sending Italian labor to Germany, etc. These examples may be multiplied indefinitely as there is immense material here.
2. Examples of Nazi contempt for all who are not of "Nordic" race, and especially for "inferior Latins".

3. Examples of the German Army's contempt for the Italian Army (anecdotes). It may be emphasized here that what military mistakes Italy has made were the fault of Fascist and Nazi strategy and leadership, not of the individual officers and men.

(b) Between Fascist leaders and the masses.

Themes:

1. Mussolini from the beginning, while pretending that all his sympathy was with the masses and all his desire for their welfare, was actually being supported by the large commercial interests for which in fact he was working. He has consistently exploited the masses for a succession of personal and state objectives. Examples of this may be shown up in contrast to his speeches.

2. Examples of immense graft by leaders, especially the Ciano family, which is said to own one-tenth of Italy.

3. Stories of political scandals and exposures of private misconduct.

4. Superstition. Suggestion that certain Fascist leaders have the universally feared "evil eye" might be used here. Now that things are going badly with him, this rumor might be spread about Mussolini.*

(c) Between Church and Regime.

In all treatment of Church questions it is well to remember that Mussolini has prided himself on his treatment of the Church. His Lateran Agreement of 1929 restored much of the traditional political power of the Pope. The Vatican, however, has not returned the compliment and has often bitterly resented and still resents Fascist dogma and conduct.

It is possible therefore both to attack Fascism from the Catholic angle and to attempt also to incite Fascist hostilities towards the Church by a heavy playing-up of suggestions that the Church is on our side.

Themes:

1. Examples of Fascist offenses to Catholic morals: murders, lies, deception - contempt of all the commandments - by party acts and the private scandalous behavior of individual Fascists.
2. Quote the Pope in his attacks on both Nazi and Fascist philosophies.
3. It must be remembered in all broadcasts on the Church that (contrary to popular belief in the United States) adherence to the Catholic religion in Italy is lax and that the prime appeal of such arguments as the above will be in the Church's political value as an enemy of Fascism and as one of our Allies. This last may be

specifically implemented by the fact that a large part of the Vatican's financial support has come from the Americas and is still coming from them, even in wartime.

(d) Between supporters of the Monarchy and supporters of the Regime. The Monarchy has lost much of its popular support, which at one time was very great, because of the King's subservience to Mussolini. Umberto, the heir, once a real idol, has had an even greater downfall. There are, however, scattered throughout the country, individuals still loyal to the Monarchy for sentimental reasons. As these are among the aristocrats they may be reached by our broadcasts.

Themes:

1. Stories of the King's famous exploits of bravery and kindness to the wounded, sick, etc., in the World War will appeal to those who still feel a sentimental attachment to Victor Emanuel.

(e) Between rival Fascist chiefs.

Themes:

1. Stories of the social ambitions of Farinacci and others which have led them into more intimate collaboration with the Nazis than was desired by most Fascists, including even Mussolini himself.
2. Stories of how other leaders such as Farinacci feel toward Ciano who, in spite of his obvious and

notorious stupidity enjoys the favor of Mussolini above those who have taken active part in the development of the party since its beginnings.

3. There is abundant other material available on this subject which can be found by special research and which will be included in the Appendix.
2. To discredit Mussolini. Italians are more receptive to this attack than to any other. The fact that the objective is already largely achieved does not mean that constant repetition of facts should be relinquished as Fascists are alert in combatting it. The objective lends itself to anecdotal and cynical-humorous treatment. News may be handled in such a way as to link Mussolini's name with every unpleasant or disastrous event.

Themes:

- A. Examples of broken promises by Mussolini himself, quoting from his own speeches. Stories of his changes and inconsistencies in the past, such as his abandonment of the Socialist Party, his complete reversal of the original Fascist program, which provided for an Italian Republic, universal suffrage, abolition of compulsory military service, the limitation of private fortunes, land for the peasants, etc.

- B. The story of the servile manner in which Mussolini

became Hitler's vassal. Now, when Mussolini asks Hitler for food, Hitler sends flattery and Mussolini accepts the substitute.

C. Humorous stories of Mussolini are immensely popular in all classes in Italy and should be frequently told - stories especially of his love life. This theme may be used in leaflets with cartoons as well as in broadcasts.

3. To discourage Italian workers from going to Germany.

Themes:

A. Examples of hardships, of mistreatment, and especially of discrimination against Italians working in Germany by their racial "superiors".

B. Play up regularly the devastating effects of British raids and the wide prevalence of disease in Germany.

This last will have a special effect among the wives and families of workers about to go to Germany.

C. Show the depressing atmosphere of Germany upon the normally gay Italian. A recent report that Italian workmen walking home from work had been arrested for singing because the Germans don't like people to sing in so serious a time, will have special appeal to Italians.

4. To discredit official Axis and Italian news and propaganda. The approaches to this objective should stress particularly broken promises of quick victory and the constantly reiterated promises of better economic con-

ditions. There is a great deal of historical material on this subject, going back to the founding of the Fascist Party, which will be developed in the Appendix.

5. To encourage Italian soldiers, sailors and aviators to surrender. Propaganda of this sort will have definite disadvantages unless it is always tied up with the truly patriotic motives behind the surrender. The mere urging to surrender because of good treatment of the prisoners has been worn so threadbare that it is probably no longer useful.

Themes:

- A. Instead of sneering, as is so often done, at the ease with which Italians surrender as evidenced by the large number of prisoners taken by the British in Africa, etc., these men should be applauded as having special courage in deserting the ranks of the Fascist army in order to weaken a cause in which they disbelieve.
6. To augment the difficulties of raising Italian levies for the Russian front and to provoke popular resistance to any such attempts on the part of the Germans.

Themes:

- A. After repeated stories of the disaster which the Germans have suffered on every part of their front and the certain continuance of this condition, why should

Italians who are already suffering from extreme economic stringency and are even threatened with starvation keep pouring money into this sieve?

7. To stimulate extreme oppositional elements to active organization, sabotage, and passive resistance. The best way to accomplish this is to start Italians thinking about the possibility of liberation as something concrete and immediate, not an indirect consequence of ultimate military defeat.

Themes should concern themselves with predictions of United Nations' victories and particularly of impending invasion of the Continent of Europe. The actual invasion of the Italian peninsula should be carefully handled in propaganda. If used at all it should be specifically described as an attack against the Nazis, from whom the Italians wish to be liberated - as a crusade, in fact, to bring about Italian freedom.

Theme on sabotage in other countries, such as Czechoslovakia, France, etc. These stories should always be given an Italian slant. It is possible, for example, to describe a bridge blown up in Norway so that it looks like an Italian bridge and the people who do the jobs so that they appear like Italians. It is desirable also to tell what anti-Fascists have done in the past and some material on this will be included in the Appendix.

8. To trouble the relationship between Italy and Japan.

Themes:

A. What possible feeling of kinship can exist between an Italian and a Japanese? Japanese have always been regarded as comic characters in Italy. We see now that behind this mask is a monster of cruelty. The atrocities by Japanese recently exposed in Hongkong, etc., prove this. But do Italians who are kind, gentle and sensitive people want to be associated with such savages? Remember that anyone who associates in these days with the Japanese will share the long hatred of the world which will follow this war.

B. What has induced Mussolini, who has said so much against the danger of the destruction of the white races by these Asiatics to change his whole philosophy and tie them to Italy with this dangerous military alliance? Is it his fear of Hitler? In a speech of September 4, 1934, Mussolini spoke of the danger of white civilization being destroyed by the expansion of the yellow race.

9. To convince Italians that an Axis victory would mean the permanent enslavement of Italy.

Themes:

- A. Exploit fears already present of German invasion of Italy. Why are there such numbers of Germans now there, thronging stations and hotels? Why are signs everywhere printed in German? Is German behavior normal? What are they planning for the future?
- B. Exploit German enslavement of peoples in occupied countries, and German loot there.
- C. Reference to German racial superiority dogmas.
- D. Stress Italian labor in Germany and Italian troops in Russia.
- E. An Axis victory would mean endless war.

IV

Propaganda Objectives

- 1. To destroy German military prestige. Regardless of strategic values or significance, themes should play up strongly every example of military inferiority in combat with any United Nations forces.
- 2. To convince the people that an Axis victory is impossible
 - (a) By describing the strategic blunders committed by the Axis High Command and the present hopeless Axis position from the long term point of view;

(b) By stressing the growing production and inexhaustible resources of the United Nations, as well as their unity of purpose. Italians will be receptive to descriptions of the resources of the Americas in particular, because the fabulous nature of these countries is a familiar Italian legend. Stress also vast Chinese manpower.

(c) By demonstrating the possibility of sensational Allied victories this year, as well as in the distant future.

Themes should especially stress Africa, invasion of the Continent via Norway or France, and failure of the German spring drive in Russia, as well as new developments under MacArthur in the Far East.

3. To present the specific American contribution to the United Nations war effort in the most convincing light

(a) By playing up actual accounts in the sphere of industrial production as in the German and French plans.

Themes should stimulate the normal Italian response to ideas of bigness. Like Americans, they have a passion for large figures, and production statistics should be constantly repeated.

(b) By making clear the determination, dynamism, offensive spirit and unity of the American people and our

bitter hatred of Fascism.

Historic themes may be developed here, one especially being the unity which comes from the kind of federation which both the founders of the American Republic and Mazzini (who wished to found an Italian Republic) designed.

4. To convince the Italian people that we are not their enemies:

- (a) By constantly recalling the close ties between Italy and the United States, due to the immense number of Italians settled in America.

Themes:

- A. Emphasize the long standing of this bond and the constant correspondence between the peoples of the two countries which was so tragically cut off when Italy, against its will and against the desire of the American people, was forced into this war.

- B. A series of broadcasts to particular towns in Italy by exiles in America who came from those towns to demonstrate closeness of ties. By emphasizing our respect for Italian culture and Italian national character as distinguished from our contempt for Fascism, whether Nordic or Mediterranean.

Themes on Italian culture in the United States should dwell especially on fine arts, on the wide study and

admiration of Dante, and on our respect for Italian scientists, such as Galvani, Volta, etc. It should be emphasized that it is impossible to speak of any of these things in the same breath with Fascism, which denies and destroys them.

5. To convince Italians that Italo-Americans are loyal to America.

Themes:

- A. The names of soldiers of Italian descent serving in the United States armed forces who are decorated for valor should be obtained and broadcast along with the citations, in the hope that these broadcasts will reach the home towns of these men's relatives in Italy. In handling such short wave material announcers should be used who speak in the accent of particular provinces.

- B. Figures should be given on the number of Italians working in American factories and in various kinds of civilian war work, as well as totals in the United States armed forces.

6. To cause Italians to fear that the longer they stick with the Axis the more surely they will lose the sympathies in America which they still have.

Themes:

- A. While Italian exiles in America realize and have explained to other Americans how difficult it has been

for Italians to revolt against the Fascist Regime, yet Americans will come in time to doubt the honor of the Italian people. While Americans still look upon Italians as Allies rather than enemies, this feeling will change if continued inertia in Italy gives the appearance of consent to Fascist domination.

7. To stress the practical implications of American sympathy to post-war Italy by describing our plans for rushing food, engineers, medical supplies to Italy, and aiding in the resurrection of Italian economy destroyed by Fascism.

Themes:

- A. Historical analogies should be stressed, showing what our contributions have been in the past to Italian engineering development, etc., and showing cases in which we have contributed to relief in times of disaster, etc.
8. To convince the Italian people that further Axis victories this summer will not mean the end of the war but only its indefinite prolongation, while a United Nations victory would mean a speedy end to the war as far as Italy is concerned. It will be particularly important in case of German successes this spring to recall all their false hopes and broken promises of a speedy termination of the war, starting with Mussolini's original

blunder of June, 1940, when he thought he could gather some loot without danger by declaring war on the eve of an expected Franco-British collapse.

V

Timing and Integration of Campaign

It would seem that at the present moment most of the purely psychological and even many of the political objectives of propaganda in Italy have already been realized, but that no important revolutionary movement can be expected until something catalyzes the diffuse revolutionary forces at work in Italy today. Consequently, our propaganda campaign must content itself with the relatively modest and static over-all objective of simply keeping open the psychological wounds already in existence in Italy. For this it will be sufficient merely to adapt our programs to the preoccupations of the moment based upon the political and military situation at the time.

At the same time we should constantly be seeking for the catalytic agent necessary to set off the revolutionary movement without which our political goals cannot be achieved. The catalytic agent may be either a spontaneous breakdown of the Fascist machinery, how-

ever local, or it may be our own military intervention, however limited. Or it might be a collapse of the Nazi regime in Germany, revolt against Germany in Hungary, or any serious breakdown anywhere within the Axis. In any case we must look for a specific extent, even if only on a small scale and of short duration, in the course of which direct action by the people would shatter the prestige of the Fascist state based upon its police power. It is possible that a limited attack with parachutists upon some center which is known to be a hot-bed of anti-Fascism would stir up a local revolt which might spread and have large consequences. In the hope of preparing such a revolt in advance we should, whenever possible, try to make the Italian people think of a United Nations' invasion attempt as a real possibility - always, of course, dwelling upon the liberation theme. It is to be assumed that any British success in Africa which will bring British forces within striking distance of Southern Italy would automatically hasten the disintegration of the Fascist state and might prove the catalytic agent for which we are looking. Similarly, any successful revolutionary upheaval in Spain or France might spread to Italy by contagion.

No. 418

April 17, 1942
12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

BBC directive on budget day authorized the following:

1. During the coming year the total British expenditure will be five times that of the last year before the war.
2. Spending directly for the war will account for all but a very little of the five thousand million pound total.
3. This will represent over 60 per cent of the total national income.
4. Therefore the economic mobilization of the nation is almost complete.
5. There has been no inflation despite the colossal burden. This has been due to the plain sense and patriotism of the people and to the wisdom of those responsible for mobilizing the financial strength of the nation.
6. A high proportion of the resources come from voluntary savings by workers who, as well as the bigger investors, are completely confident of victory.

No. 419
April 17, 1942
12 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I received the following memorandum this evening,
which I pass on to you at once:

"I had a long talk this afternoon with Raoul Aglion, the representative here of the Free French, with whom I have been in close contact for a couple of months.

"With regard to the situation at the Consulate in New York, he told me that he had very close contacts there and kept well informed of developments. He said that it was not correct that there had been either any substantial transfer of the archives to the house of the Consul General, Jacques d'Aumale, as previously rumored, or any unusual destruction of documents during the past few days. He said that, however, three small packages, which might have been codes or d'Aumale's personal correspondence, had been taken to his house. He said the impression generally prevailed among the Consul's staff that there would not be an immediate break.

"Apparently all correspondence with South America, and I believe including Martinique, passes through the Consul General, and it is therefore possible that their archives might have considerable value.

"Aglion said that for his part he thought that it would be a mistake for us to break with Vichy, although he would naturally like to see further assistance and recognition to the de Gaulle movement. He thought that our position would be much stronger with the people of France, and the cleavage between the Vichy Government and the French people much greater, if we stayed on until Vichy forced the break. He felt that the collaborationist French would have a much freer hand if we were out of the way and that our presence there, even with Laval in, would be a serious deterrent.

"Aglion did not seem to feel that the change would be likely to result in any early turning over of the French fleet. Undoubtedly Darlan, who may have expected to be the successor, will be seriously miffed by Laval's appointment, and thereby less likely to fall in with any plans Laval might have with regard to the fleet. Further, he did not feel that the fleet would be as likely to take Laval's orders as they would Darlan's.

"Finally, he said that the appointment of Laval, for whose character the French people by and large had no respect, would tend to weaken the Vichy Government with the people and deprive the Government of the type of slogans Petain had tried to use, namely, probity, integrity, etc. Laval, he said, was everywhere recognized as one of the most corrupt members of the pre-catastrophe governments, and while people might recognize his cleverness, no one had a high regard for his integrity.

"Aglion also seemed to think that for the time being Laval would try to propitiate the United States, realizing the possible effect on his own career of a break, unless, of course, we played into his hands by ourselves breaking relations, which is probably what he wants, so that he can then say that the United States has deserted the French people, etc.

"I pass this on for what it may be worth, and naturally the source should be carefully protected, as it is somewhat unorthodox coming, as it does, from a well-known figure in the Free French Movement."

No. 420

April 18, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is taken from the Weekly
Empire Guidance of the British Ministry of
Information:

"There are still no signs of Axis troop concentration in the Balkans. There are no signs in Libya that Rommel intends to advance further. Apparently he is digging in. The Luftwaffe is compelled to divert a large proportion of its forces from the Russian front to attack Malta which has been subjected to many weeks of the heaviest air attack ever delivered on an objective of comparable size. Stress the unity of the Anglo-Russian front.

"Far East: Stress Ceylon's present readiness to resist and note that the threat of the American Navy on rear communications is the most effective check that could apply to the Japanese advance.

"France: Avoid until clearer speculation on strategic possibilities and continue to refer to Petain more in sorrow than in anger. "

"India: The Cripps mission was not in vain. The air is clearer and there are brighter prospects for further negotiations. Stress the fact that the Indians are determined to resist the aggression of the Japanese."

No. 421

April 18, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Home Intelligence report for the week ending April 13. The mood of the public is variously described with three main discernable trends:

"1. Expectancy. 'Soon things will really begin to happen.' There is an increasing belief that 'We will not be long in following suit in the West' when Hitler strikes on the Russian front. It will be 'like Saint Nazaire or bigger'. Marshall's arrival is quoted as evidence for this belief;

"2. Detachment. Lack of discussion and talk about the war is widespread, at the same time. People are 'unable or unwilling to assimilate most of the news whether bad or good'. 'The war is becoming too vast, we cannot hope to understand it;'

"3. Mixture of pessimistic comment on naval losses, continued Japanese successes in Philippines and Burma, failure of India proposals, with restrained satisfaction at heavy raids on Germany, the increasingly drastic steps by the government, evidence that 'we have tried in India', the 'end of a hard winter and the coming of better weather.'

"a. India. General disappointment but also appreciation of the part Cripps played. 'No one could have done more.' The failure 'in no way lowered the public's esteem of him, on the contrary, his reputation was enhanced.' The public also praises the government for 'making all possible concessions short of what might have been disastrous to the Allied cause'. There are the following minor criticisms, although to a great extent the responsibility for the failure is laid to the Indians:

"1. The Cripps' offer came too late;

"2. The Indians must be aware that the government offered the concessions only because of

the gravity of the war situation;

"3. Halifax's speech of April 8th was 'ill-timed'.

"b. Far East - Naval Losses. The public was considerably shocked at the sinking of two cruisers, the Hermes and the merchant ships. 'People are becoming more and more worried about naval losses'. Chief emotion is confused and bewildered worry at 'apparently complete inability to counter Japan on land, sea or air', although some anger is expressed at the lack of protection. The announcement that dive bombers were responsible occasioned some bitterness 'in view of our lack of them.'

"c. Bataan. Public has accepted its fall as inevitable and still draws a contrast between the fall of Hong Kong and Singapore and the American resistance.

"d. Russia and Second Front: Public expresses little loss of confidence in Russia's ability to succeed. However, there is a growing wish for 'a more effective share in Europe, an order to relieve them when the German spring drive starts.'

"e. Government. Both criticism of and interest in the government is slight.

"f. Communism. Reports of increasing interest in the communist party comes from three regions.

'They are not saying anything to which the average person could take exception.' 'However, the new adherents to the communist faith want them to be our own British brand, not that of Lenin and Karl Marx.'

"g. Broadcasting. The public is increasingly listening to the German radio immediately after it has noted the preliminary announcement of exciting news."

No. 422

April 17, 1942
6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

This report, covering highlights of the week's war on the propaganda front, is based on recording of short-wave broadcasts at FCC's listening posts in Washington and Portland, Oregon; the Columbia Broadcasting System's listening posts in San Francisco and New York; on medium wave broadcasts recorded by the British Broadcasting Corporation, and by our own monitors.

WHAT THE ENEMY DID

The United States won the initiative this week on one of the key sectors of the Fourth front, and put the Axis on the defensive. Axis and Axis-dominated radios devoted more time to counter-propaganda against our verbal offensive threatening an invasion of Europe than to any single propaganda line. The endlessly repeated Axis line was: "An invasion is impossible." This marks the first spring since the

war began that the Axis has been snarled up in the war of nerves, outsmarted, made the victim of its own technique and forced to take a negative position on a major military question.

Main pegs for the Axis line that an invasion is impossible were: High United Nations' shipping losses in all the oceans of the world (two million tons since the war began); inability to replace lost tonnage; inability to man the ships that are left; American inability to aid Russia or Britain; production difficulties; German preparedness and ability to transport men and materials anywhere necessary as a result of the Axis inner position on the Continent.

The United Nations can only talk of an offensive, but can never do anything about it the Axis declared when Marshall and Hopkins visited London. Other theories on the visit were: they had come to stir up stagnant British armament production; to discover why Britain was afraid to start an offensive; to warn Britain not to expect American aid, since Russia's need was greater; to take advantage of Britain's difficulties in India; to plan an offensive in the Middle East; to find more cannon fodder after

Russia fell; to divert German troops from the Russian front.

The Axis also said that in addition to lack of ships and material, lack of men made an invasion impossible. Berlin invited an invasion attempt "because we could get rid of the enemy in large numbers instead of having to look for him."

Perhaps the main feature of the Axis argument against the possibility of an invasion of Europe was the stress on United Nations' shipping losses. This was played harder and more frequently than ever before.

The Axis plugged away repeatedly on two other main news items, developing expected propaganda lines from them. The two items were the fall of Bataan and the failure of the Cripps mission to India.

According to the Axis, Bataan, once it had collapsed, suddenly assumed major military importance: Its fall was as great a blow to the United States as Pearl Harbor. Difficult terrain, and not American and Filipino troops, had delayed Bataan's fall, Tokyo said. It added that Japan had lost only one-fourth the troops she had anticipated losing. Tokyo further claimed that while the Japanese troops were heroes, the Americans were cowards: at the first sign of danger they had fled helter-skelter and

begged for a truce. Americans were accused of having mowed down Filipino troops so that there would be fewer mouths to feed with the little food available. The capture of Corregidor was a question of hours, Tokyo claimed.

The Axis line on the failure of Cripps' mission was that it was also a failure for Roosevelt, Churchill and the British Empire. Churchill was said to be secretly pleased at his rival's failure. New Delhi was called Roosevelt's Diplomatic Pearl Harbor, while Louis Johnson was described as having stood by, representing America, the jackal, waiting to snap up still another part of the British Empire. Tokyo claimed credit for the "Cripps Fiasco", declaring that the Japanese naval victory off Ceylon and in the Indian Ocean had thwarted Anglo-American designs on India. The result was played by the enemy not as an Axis victory but as a United Nations defeat.

During the negotiations the Axis said India's choice was to become a battlefield or a darling of the Axis and thereby achieve freedom.

At the end of the week, Axis reaction to the Laval appointment was slight and cautious. Berlin said it was an internal French matter, but that Laval's entry into the

Cabinet, it was believed, would not "affect Germany adversely, but rather to the contrary."

The Axis insisted that the change in the Cabinet meant France believed the Axis would win the war.

By Thursday night the Axis began to get into high gear and Berlin and Rome claimed that Churchill and Roosevelt had only themselves to blame for the new French government. For Churchill had sent the RAF to bomb defenseless French civilians and Roosevelt is now taking a cheap revenge by refusing to send food to French widows and orphans, and is, therefore, starving them.

The Axis slighted the RAF raids over Europe; ignored United Nations' air successes in the Far East and Germany's "Spring offensive", which was so well advertised during the cold winter months.

WHAT WE DID

The main emphasis of our shortwave stations during the week was on the war of nerves. We were careful not to promise an invasion, nor to set a time for one, but on every possible occasion the question of an invasion of Europe this spring was brought up. The Marshall-Hopkins visit was the main peg for this aspect of the nerve war. Every new phase of the visit, the people Marshall saw, the

statement he made, etc., was used to pound away at the impending United Nations' offensive against some point on Europe. The German decree about martial law in Brest was also used to point up the fact that the German High Command was worried about the possibility of a coming invasion of the Continent and frightened about what attitude the people in France would take. Virginio Gayda's statement that the United States wanted Britain to launch an offensive against Europe also was used frequently. Statements by several well-known officials, such as Litvinov and Bevin, were quoted to show we wanted action now and were ready to act this Spring.

We ridiculed reported Nazi efforts to put out peace feelers in Stockholm. We stressed the effectiveness of RAF round-the-clock raids over the industrial areas of Germany and the key points of occupied France.

We emphasized the Russian successes along the Eastern front, particularly at Kharkov and Bryansk; reported that the Russians had air superiority in the East and that Soviet officials were more optimistic than ever with the arrival of Lease-Lend material in greater and greater quantities; also emphasized the fact that the first big-

scale Nazi attacks of the Spring had been repulsed in the Caucasus.

We praised the defenders of Bataan for their long and heroic stand, reported frequently our air successes in the Far East and counter-balanced reports of losses in the Bay of Bengal with reports of Italian shipping losses in the Mediterranean.

Our reports on the Cripps' negotiations were vague and uncertain. They wavered between optimism and lost hope.

At the end of the week we turned our attention to M. Laval. The handling of the news that he was again to be in the Cabinet at first indicated that the United States was taken by surprise and had been disconcerted by an Axis diplomatic triumph.

But it did not take us long to begin giving Laval the most severe verbal drubbing ever handed out over our short-wave radios. Hints from the American press were broadcast to the effect that the United States would take strong action on the Vichy situation. It was pointed out that Italy would not be pleased at the closer collaboration of France with Germany, since this would endanger Italian claims on France.

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- 8 -

It was also pointed out that France was dropping to the status of a Balkan nation.

Our radios quoted frequently and extensively from the State Department note rejecting Vichy's protest to our sending a Consul to Brazzaville.